Characterization of tie-breaking plurality rules
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Publication:2171850
DOI10.1007/s00355-021-01382-3zbMath1504.91096OpenAlexW4210781757MaRDI QIDQ2171850
Publication date: 9 September 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-021-01382-3
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