Stable preference aggregation with infinite population
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Publication:2171855
DOI10.1007/s00355-022-01389-4zbMath1498.91170OpenAlexW4214600410MaRDI QIDQ2171855
Publication date: 9 September 2022
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-022-01389-4
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