Dynamic game of international pollution control with general oligopolistic equilibrium: Neary meets Dockner and Long

DOI10.1007/s13235-022-00434-2zbMath1498.91246OpenAlexW4214879108MaRDI QIDQ2172091

Akihiko Yanase, Keita Kamei

Publication date: 15 September 2022

Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-022-00434-2

zbMATH Keywords

international tradepollution permitsgeneral oligopolistic equilibriumpollution control game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Special types of economic equilibria (91B52) Applications of game theory (91A80) Trade models (91B60) Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Dynamic games (91A25)

Related Items (1)

Dynamic games in environmental economics and management

Cites Work

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• Feedback Nash equilibria for non-linear differential games in pollution control
• International pollution control: Cooperative versus noncooperative strategies
• International pollution problems: Unilateral initiatives by environmental groups in one country
• Global Warming with Green and Brown Consumers
• ENVIRONMENTAL MANAGEMENT POLICY UNDER INTERNATIONAL CARBON LEAKAGE
• Differential Games in Industrial Economics
• The Impact of Trade on Intra-Industry Reallocations and Aggregate Industry Productivity

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