An evolutionary approach to pollution control in competitive markets
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Publication:2172096
DOI10.1007/S13235-021-00412-0zbMath1498.91298OpenAlexW3216246481MaRDI QIDQ2172096
Publication date: 15 September 2022
Published in: Dynamic Games and Applications (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s13235-021-00412-0
potential gamesdominant strategy implementationnegative externalityPigouvian taxevolutionary implementation
Environmental economics (natural resource models, harvesting, pollution, etc.) (91B76) Potential and congestion games (91A14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cites Work
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