Cheating as a dynamic marketing strategy in monopoly, cartel and duopoly

DOI10.1007/S10100-019-00652-XOpenAlexW2978607953MaRDI QIDQ2172988

Markus Eigruber, Franz Wirl

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-019-00652-x

zbMATH Keywords

competitiondifferential gamecheatingDieselgate

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Related Items (2)

CEJOR special issue: dynamic optimization in management and economics ⋮ Dynamics and stability of evolutionary optimal strategies in duopoly

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Advertising with spillover effects in a differential oligopoly game with differentiated goods.
• The persistence of social strategies under increasing competitive pressure
• Optimal quality provision when reputation is subject to random inspections
• Cheating to win: dishonesty and the intensity of competition

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