How relieving is public debt relief? Monetary and fiscal policies in a monetary union during a debt crisis

DOI10.1007/S10100-020-00677-7OpenAlexW3009644623MaRDI QIDQ2172992

Yanyan Li

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: CEJOR. Central European Journal of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10100-020-00677-7

zbMATH Keywords

economic dynamicsnumerical solutionsmacroeconomicsmonetary uniondynamic gamepublic debtPareto solutionfeedback Nash equilibrium

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Operations research and management science (90Bxx)

Related Items (2)

CEJOR special issue: dynamic optimization in management and economics ⋮ Should fiscal policies be centralized in a monetary union? A dynamic game approach

Uses Software

• OPTGAME3

Cites Work

• Monetary and Fiscal policy design in the EMU: An overview
• Global implications of monetary and fiscal policy rules in the EMU
• Debt stabilization games in the presence of risk premia
• EMU stability: direct and indirect risk sharing
• OPTGAME3: A Dynamic Game Solver and an Economic Example
• Interactions Between Fiscal and Monetary Authorities in a Three-Country New-Keynesian Model of a Monetary Union
• Power, growth, and the voracity effect
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