Explicit vs. statistical targeting in affirmative action: theory and evidence from Chicago's exam schools

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.104996zbMath1437.91318OpenAlexW3000574161WikidataQ126336608 ScholiaQ126336608MaRDI QIDQ2173082

Parag A. Pathak, Tayfun Sönmez, Umut Mert Dur

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.104996

zbMATH Keywords

integrationtargetingdiversityprecedence

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Matching models (91B68)

Related Items (6)

Improving the Chilean College Admissions System ⋮ Interdistrict school choice: a theory of student assignment ⋮ Fairness under affirmative action policies with overlapping reserves ⋮ Prioritized organ allocation rules under compatibility constraints ⋮ Finding a stable matching under type-specific minimum quotas ⋮ Slot-specific priorities with capacity transfers

Cites Work

• School choice with controlled choice constraints: hard bounds versus soft bounds
• School choice: impossibilities for affirmative action
• A tale of two mechanisms: Student placement
• Effective affirmative action in school choice
• Matching with slot-specific priorities: Theory
• Stable Matching in Large Economies
• Affirmative Action in India via Vertical, Horizontal, and Overlapping Reservations

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