Coalitional bargaining with consistent counterfactuals

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105013zbMath1437.91027OpenAlexW2544744562MaRDI QIDQ2173092

Ramon Caminal, Roberto Burguet

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10261/175376

zbMATH Keywords

cooperative gamescoalitional bargainingconsistent beliefsendogenous disagreement payoffs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26)

Cites Work

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• Symmetrically pairwise-bargained allocations in an assignment market
• On the reduced game property and its converse
• Beyond Nash bargaining theory: The Nash set
• Multilateral bargaining problems
• Coalitional bargaining with competition to make offers
• Recognition for sale
• Proposal power and majority rule in multilateral bargaining with costly recognition
• The Coalitional Nash Bargaining Solution
• Potential, Value, and Consistency
• A Noncooperative Theory of Coalitional Bargaining
• Bidding for the surplus: a non-cooperative approach to the Shapley value

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