On stable and efficient mechanisms for priority-based allocation problems
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Publication:2173093
DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105014zbMath1437.91323OpenAlexW2771397279MaRDI QIDQ2173093
Kang Rong, Qianfeng Tang, Yong-Chao Zhang
Publication date: 22 April 2020
Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2020.105014
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