Subgame-perfect cooperation in an extensive game

DOI10.1016/j.jet.2020.105017zbMath1437.91063OpenAlexW1760610438MaRDI QIDQ2173095

Parkash Chander, Myrna Holtz Wooders

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/1803/15897

zbMATH Keywords

coalition-proof Nash equilibriumsubgame perfectioncoalitional gameextensive gamebargaining gamecentipede game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Noncooperative games (91A10) Games in extensive form (91A18)

Related Items (7)

Minimal Current Payments Algorithm for Sustainable Cooperation in Multicriteria Game ⋮ Subgame Perfect Pareto Equilibria for Multicriteria Game with Chance Moves ⋮ On the core of dynamic cooperative games ⋮ On the \(\gamma \)-core of asymmetric aggregative games ⋮ The groupwise-pivotal referral auction: core-selecting referral strategy-proof mechanism ⋮ A cooperation scheme in multistage game of renewable resource extraction with asymmetric players ⋮ A novel payoff distribution procedure for sustainable cooperation in an extensive game with payoffs at all nodes

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