Optimal incentives for teams: a multiscale decision theory approach

DOI10.1007/S10479-019-03478-7zbMath1437.91148OpenAlexW2990084789WikidataQ126774725 ScholiaQ126774725MaRDI QIDQ2173130

Aditya U. Kulkarni, Christian Wernz

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-019-03478-7

zbMATH Keywords

systems engineeringincentivesprincipal-agent problemteamsmultiscale decision theory

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Management decision making, including multiple objectives (90B50) Principal-agent models (91B43)

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