Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value

DOI10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2019.10.002zbMath1437.91040OpenAlexW2752460205WikidataQ126834199 ScholiaQ126834199MaRDI QIDQ2173166

Christian Trudeau, Juan J. Vidal-Puga

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Mathematical Social Sciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://web2.uwindsor.ca/economics/RePEc/wis/pdf/1705.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Shapley valuegraphscliquenucleolus

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Cooperative games (91A12) Games involving graphs (91A43) Games on graphs (graph-theoretic aspects) (05C57)

Related Items (2)

A non-cooperative approach to the folk rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems ⋮ Minimum cost spanning tree problems as value sharing problems

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Coincidence of cooperative game theoretic solutions in the appointment problem
• A new stable and more responsive cost sharing solution for minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Understanding the coincidence of allocation rules: symmetry and orthogonality in TU-games
• Cost monotonicity, consistency and minimum cost spanning tree games
• Axioms of invariance for TU-games
• Fair cost allocations under conflicts - a game-theoretic point of view -
• Sharing a minimal cost spanning tree: beyond the folk solution
• On the coincidence of the prenucleolus and the Shapley value
• On the notion of cycles in hypergraphs
• Super-modularity: Applications to convex games and to the greedy algorithm for LP
• Centrality and power in social networks: A game theoretic approach.
• Domination in intersecting hypergraphs
• Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance
• The within groups and the between groups Myerson values
• Bargaining with commitments
• On the core of information graph games
• Sharing a polluted river
• On the set of extreme core allocations for minimal cost spanning tree problems
• A fair rule in minimum cost spanning tree problems
• Cores of convex games
• A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case
• On cost allocation for a spanning tree: A game theoretic approach
• Graphs and Cooperation in Games
• On the Complexity of Cooperative Solution Concepts
• A Game Theoretic Approach to Problems in Telecommunication
• On the Nucleolus as a Power Index
• Algorithmic Aspects of the Core of Combinatorial Optimization Games
• The Nucleolus of a Characteristic Function Game

This page was built for publication: Clique games: a family of games with coincidence between the nucleolus and the Shapley value