Grouping, in-group bias and the cost of cheating

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2020.02.002zbMath1437.91096OpenAlexW3006475492MaRDI QIDQ2173391

Moti Michaeli

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.002

zbMATH Keywords

costly signalinggroup formationsocial identityin-group biasPD game

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Cites Work

• What to maximize if you must
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• Social cohesion and the evolution of altruism
• One, Two, Many—Insensitivity to Group Size in Games with Concentrated Benefits and Dispersed Costs
• A Theory of Fairness, Competition, and Cooperation
• Endogenous Group Formation via Unproductive Costs
• Understanding Social Preferences with Simple Tests
• Evolution of Preferences1

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