Formalizing common belief with no underlying assumption on individual beliefs

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.007zbMath1437.91143OpenAlexW3006806343WikidataQ114668048 ScholiaQ114668048MaRDI QIDQ2173395

Satoshi Fukuda

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.02.007

zbMATH Keywords

non-monotonic reasoningcommon knowledgecommon belieflogical omnisciencestrict dominancecommon bases

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

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