Vagueness in multidimensional proposals

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.003zbMath1437.91162OpenAlexW3011967535MaRDI QIDQ2173407

Qiaoxi Zhang

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.03.003

zbMATH Keywords

signalingdelegationvaguenessintuitive criterion

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Decision theory (91B06) (n)-person games, (n>2) (91A06)

Related Items (1)

Strategic stability of equilibria in multi-sender signaling games

Cites Work

• Hiding an inconvenient truth: lies and vagueness
• Intentional vagueness
• A model of electoral competition with incomplete information
• Lies, damned lies, and political campaigns
• Electoral competition under imperfect information
• Ambiguity in election games
• Hiding information in electoral competition.
• Strategic independence and perfect Bayesian equilibria
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• A Model of Expertise
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Competition in Persuasion
• Sequential Equilibria
• The War of Information
• Polarization and Inefficient Policies
• Informative Cheap Talk in Elections
• Optimal Delegation
• Multiple Referrals and Multidimensional Cheap Talk

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