Random assignments on sequentially dichotomous domains

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.006zbMath1437.91233OpenAlexW2970956394WikidataQ127323912 ScholiaQ127323912MaRDI QIDQ2173423

Peng Liu

Publication date: 22 April 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.05.006

zbMATH Keywords

random assignmentprobabilistic serial rulesd-strategy-proofsequentially dichotomous domain

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Related Items (3)

Ordinal Bayesian incentive compatibility in random assignment model ⋮ Structure of single-peaked preferences ⋮ Structured preferences: a literature survey

Cites Work

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