Are the better cooperators dormant or quiescent?

DOI10.1016/j.mbs.2019.108272zbMath1437.92090arXiv1904.06667OpenAlexW2981724624WikidataQ90923333 ScholiaQ90923333MaRDI QIDQ2173878

Thibaut Sellinger, Aurélien Tellier, Volker Hösel, Johannes Müller

Publication date: 17 April 2020

Published in: Mathematical Biosciences (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1904.06667

zbMATH Keywords

cooperationprisoner's dilemmaquiescenceseed bank

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Population dynamics (general) (92D25) Evolutionary games (91A22)

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