Dissolving a partnership securely

DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01177-9zbMath1437.91227OpenAlexW2611802418WikidataQ128352343 ScholiaQ128352343MaRDI QIDQ2175968

Matt Van Essen, John Wooders

Publication date: 30 April 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-019-01177-9

zbMATH Keywords

maximinauctionpartnerships

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32)

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Unnamed Item
• Dissolving a partnership dynamically
• Implementation of maximin rational expectations equilibrium
• Truth, justice, and cake cutting
• Prudence versus sophistication in voting strategy
• Amicable divorce: Dissolving a partnership with simple mechanisms
• Uncertainty, efficiency and incentive compatibility: ambiguity solves the conflict between efficiency and incentive compatibility
• A matter of interpretation: ambiguous contracts and liquidated damages
• The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a Surplus
• Implementing Efficient Egalitarian Equivalent Allocations
• Dissolving a Partnership Efficiently
• How to Cut A Cake Fairly
• A Self-Administered Solution of the Bargaining Problem
• A Game of Fair Division
• A Procedure for Generating Pareto-Efficient Egalitarian-Equivalent Allocations
• Mechanism design with maxmin agents: Theory and an application to bilateral trade

This page was built for publication: Dissolving a partnership securely