The gambling effect of final-offer arbitration in bargaining

DOI10.1007/s00199-018-1169-xzbMath1437.91221OpenAlexW2905001444MaRDI QIDQ2175971

Kang Rong, King King Li

Publication date: 30 April 2020

Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-018-1169-x

zbMATH Keywords

bargainingdeadlinefinal-offer arbitrationalternating offer

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Probabilistic games; gambling (91A60)

Related Items (1)

No compromise: uncertain costs in reputational bargaining

Cites Work

• Nash meets Rubinstein in final-offer arbitration
• Alternating-offer games with final-offer arbitration
• Equilibrium Strategies for Final-Offer Arbitration: There is no Median Convergence
• Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model
• Gradualism in Bargaining and Contribution Games
• Perfect equilibria in a model of bargaining with arbitration

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