The evolution of conventions under condition-dependent mistakes
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Publication:2175972
DOI10.1007/s00199-019-01174-yzbMath1437.91071OpenAlexW2510317965WikidataQ128522506 ScholiaQ128522506MaRDI QIDQ2175972
Ennio Bilancini, Leonardo Boncinelli
Publication date: 30 April 2020
Published in: Economic Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2158/1161997
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Competing conventions with costly information acquisition, The evolution of conventions in the presence of social competition, Statistical inference in evolutionary dynamics, Exit from equilibrium in coordination games under probit choice, Interacting nonlinear reinforced stochastic processes: Synchronization or non-synchronization, Evolution and Rawlsian social choice in matching, Positive feedback in coordination games: stochastic evolutionary dynamics and the logit choice rule, Risk attitudes and risk dominance in the long run, A stochastic stability analysis with observation errors in normal form games, Imitation and local interactions: long run equilibrium selection, On the uniqueness of quantal response equilibria and its application to network games
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