On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games
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Publication:2177800
DOI10.1007/s10479-018-2971-3zbMath1437.91075OpenAlexW2884486602WikidataQ129484875 ScholiaQ129484875MaRDI QIDQ2177800
A. J. Shaiju, K. S. Mallikarjuna Rao, Dharini Hingu
Publication date: 6 May 2020
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s10479-018-2971-3
replicator dynamicsevolutionary game theoryevolutionarily stable strategygames with continuous strategy space
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Cites Work
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