Efficient computation of the Shapley value for large-scale linear production games
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Publication:2177801
DOI10.1007/s10479-018-3047-0zbMath1437.91035OpenAlexW2892353438WikidataQ129248283 ScholiaQ129248283MaRDI QIDQ2177801
Tri-Dung Nguyen, Phuoc Hoang Le, Tolga Bektaş
Publication date: 6 May 2020
Published in: Annals of Operations Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://eprints.soton.ac.uk/425036/1/LPGames.pdf
Cooperative games (91A12) Applications of game theory (91A80) Production theory, theory of the firm (91B38) Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Randomized algorithms (68W20)
Related Items (4)
Approximation of the Shapley value for the Euclidean travelling salesman game ⋮ Designing an allocation mechanism for a coalitional production game ⋮ A preemptive goal programming for multi‐objective cooperative games: an application to multi‐objective linear production ⋮ An empirical distribution of the number of subsets in the core partitions of hedonic games
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