Replicator based on imitation for finite and arbitrary networked communities
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Publication:2177884
DOI10.1016/j.amc.2020.125166OpenAlexW3012371050MaRDI QIDQ2177884
Publication date: 7 May 2020
Published in: Applied Mathematics and Computation (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.amc.2020.125166
Quantum dynamics and nonequilibrium statistical mechanics (general) (82C10) Evolutionary games (91A22)
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