Epistemic game theory without types structures: an application to psychological games

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.12.005zbMath1437.91090OpenAlexW2922303709WikidataQ126440190 ScholiaQ126440190MaRDI QIDQ2178003

Pierpaolo Battigalli, Federico Sanna, Roberto Corrao

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://econpapers.repec.org/RePEc:igi:igierp:641

zbMATH Keywords

consistencyepistemic game theorystrong rationalizabilitypsychological gameshierarchies of beliefssubjective rationality

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items (2)

Common belief in rationality in psychological games. Belief-dependent utility and the limits of strategic reasoning ⋮ Beliefs, plans, and perceived intentions in dynamic games

Cites Work

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