Payoff information and learning in signaling games

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.011zbMath1437.91099arXiv1709.01024OpenAlexW2922865182WikidataQ126434248 ScholiaQ126434248MaRDI QIDQ2178008

Drew Fudenberg, Kevin X. He

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.01024

zbMATH Keywords

learningsignaling gamesequilibrium refinementsbandit problemspayoff information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26) Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

Related Items (3)

Informed principal problems in bilateral trading ⋮ Observability, dominance, and induction in learning models ⋮ Player-compatible learning and player-compatible equilibrium

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Fixed-equilibrium rationalizability in signaling games
• Learning mixed equilibria
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium with heterogeneous beliefs
• Payoff information and self-confirming equilibrium
• Signaling Games and Stable Equilibria
• Rational Learning Leads to Nash Equilibrium
• Equilibrium Selection in Signaling Games
• Rationalizable partition-confirmed equilibrium
• Berk-Nash Equilibrium: A Framework for Modeling Agents With Misspecified Models
• Learning and Type Compatibility in Signaling Games
• On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria
• Steady State Learning and Nash Equilibrium

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