Weak belief and permissibility
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Publication:2178012
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.007zbMath1437.91092OpenAlexW2995288575MaRDI QIDQ2178012
Nicodemo De Vito, Emiliano Catonini
Publication date: 7 May 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.11.007
rationalitypermissibilityepistemic game theorylexicographic probability systemsDekel-Fudenberg proceduretype structuresinfinitely more likely
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