Accuracy and retaliation in repeated games with imperfect private monitoring: experiments

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003zbMath1437.91069OpenAlexW3000432330WikidataQ126396584 ScholiaQ126396584MaRDI QIDQ2178016

Hitoshi Matsushima, Yutaka Kayaba, Tomohisa Toyama

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.12.003

zbMATH Keywords

experimentsrepeated prisoner's dilemmagenerous tit-for-tatimperfect private monitoringretaliation intensity

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Experimental studies (91A90)

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Uses Software

• Z-Tree

Cites Work

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