An epistemic analysis of dynamic games with unawareness

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.006zbMath1437.91085OpenAlexW2981942659MaRDI QIDQ2178020

Pierfrancesco Guarino

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2019.10.006

zbMATH Keywords

dynamic gamesstrong rationalizabilitystrong beliefconditional probability systemscanonical hierarchical structuredynamic exogenous unawareness structure

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Dynamic games (91A25) Rationality and learning in game theory (91A26)

Related Items (2)

Discovery and equilibrium in games with unawareness ⋮ Common belief in rationality in games with unawareness

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