Bribing the Self

DOI10.1016/J.GEB.2019.12.010zbMath1437.91120OpenAlexW3000216242MaRDI QIDQ2178022

Silvia Saccardo, Uri Gneezy, Roel van Veldhuizen, Marta Serra-Garcia

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/233525

zbMATH Keywords

advicelaboratory experimentself-deceptionself-imagemotivated beliefs

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Signaling and communication in game theory (91A28) Experimental studies (91A90)

Related Items (2)

On self-serving strategic beliefs ⋮ It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion

Cites Work

• In search of good probability assessors: an experimental comparison of elicitation rules for confidence judgments
• Self-serving interpretations of ambiguity in other-regarding behavior
• Exploiting moral wiggle room: experiments demonstrating an illusory preference for fairness
• It's not a lie if you believe the norm does not apply: conditional norm-following and belief distortion
• Strategic Information Transmission
• What Drives Taxi Drivers? A Field Experiment on Fraud in a Market for Credence Goods
• Preferences for Truth‐Telling
• Promises and Partnership

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