Fairness and partial coercion in land assembly

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.011zbMath1437.91231OpenAlexW3003255038MaRDI QIDQ2178023

Rakesh Chaturvedi

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.011

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designproperty rightseminent domainland assembly

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Resource and cost allocation (including fair division, apportionment, etc.) (91B32) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

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