On the non-existence of stable matches with incomplete information

DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.008zbMath1437.91311OpenAlexW3004534156MaRDI QIDQ2178025

Max Alston

Publication date: 7 May 2020

Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.008

zbMATH Keywords

stabilitygame theorynonexistencematchingincomplete information

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Matching models (91B68) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)

Related Items

Stability in sequential matching with incomplete information

Cites Work

• An analysis of the German university admissions system
• Stability with one-sided incomplete information
• Paths to stability in two-sided matching under uncertainty
• Two-sided matching with interdependent values
• Strong belief and forward induction reasoning.
• The assignment game. I: The core
• Square Matrices of Order 2
• Pricing and investments in matching markets
• Stable Matching With Incomplete Information
• A Genuine Rank-Dependent Generalization of the Von Neumann-Morgenstern Expected Utility Theorem
• College Admissions and the Stability of Marriage