Essentially stable matchings
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Publication:2178028
DOI10.1016/j.geb.2020.01.009zbMath1437.91324OpenAlexW2917433950MaRDI QIDQ2178028
Andrew Kloosterman, David Delacrétaz, Peter Troyan
Publication date: 7 May 2020
Published in: Games and Economic Behavior (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:d0c82b25-9d2a-483f-ad52-c9f51d81b2ef
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