Tournament solutions based on cooperative game theory
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Publication:2178642
DOI10.1007/s00182-019-00681-5zbMath1437.91034arXiv1511.04437OpenAlexW3103496305WikidataQ127856252 ScholiaQ127856252MaRDI QIDQ2178642
Vladimir V. Mazalov, A. Yu. Kondratiev
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Published in: International Journal of Game Theory (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1511.04437
simple gameuncovered setShapley-Shubik indexdesirability relationPenrose-Banzhaf indextournament solution
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