The exchange attack: how to distinguish six rounds of AES with \(2^{88.2}\) chosen plaintexts
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Publication:2178861
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_12zbMath1455.94118OpenAlexW2990731611MaRDI QIDQ2178861
Sondre Rønjom, Navid Ghaedi Bardeh
Publication date: 11 May 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-34618-8_12
differential cryptanalysisAESSPNexchange-equivalence attacksexchange-equivalence classexchange-invariant setssecret-key model
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