The theoretical Shapley-Shubik probability of an election inversion in a toy symmetric version of the US presidential electoral system

DOI10.1007/s00355-018-1162-0zbMath1437.91169OpenAlexW3124079587WikidataQ128875551 ScholiaQ128875551MaRDI QIDQ2179470

Dominique Lepelley, Thibault Laurent, Michel Le Breton, Olivier de Mouzon

Publication date: 12 May 2020

Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-018-1162-0

zbMATH Keywords

election inversionShapley-Shubik probabilityUS presidential electoral system

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Voting theory (91B12)

Related Items (4)

“One Man, One Vote” Part 1: Electoral Justice in the U.S. Electoral College: Banzhaf and Shapley/Shubik Versus May ⋮ Asymptotic probability of majority inversion under a general binomial voting model ⋮ The power of small coalitions under two-tier majority on regular graphs ⋮ Welfare ordering of voting weight allocations

Cites Work

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• The probability of conflicts in a U. S. presidential type election
• Voter Antagonism and the Paradox of Voting
• The electoral college vs. a direct vote: Policy bias, reversals, and indeterminate outcomes†
• Probabilities of Certain Election Results

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