Majority judgment vs. majority rule
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Publication:2179472
DOI10.1007/s00355-019-01200-xzbMath1437.91177OpenAlexW2417977556WikidataQ127581919 ScholiaQ127581919MaRDI QIDQ2179472
Publication date: 12 May 2020
Published in: Social Choice and Welfare (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/s00355-019-01200-x
Related Items (9)
Deepest voting: a new way of electing ⋮ An extension of majority judgment to non-uniform qualitative scales ⋮ Voting: a machine learning approach ⋮ Majority Judgment vs. Approval Voting ⋮ A correspondence between voting procedures and stochastic orderings ⋮ How to choose a president, mayor, chair: Balinski and Laraki unpacked ⋮ Tie-breaking the highest median: alternatives to the majority judgment ⋮ The Borda majority count ⋮ An Arrovian impossibility in combining ranking and evaluation
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