Using sub-majoritarian rules to select the winner of a competition

DOI10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109068zbMath1437.91174OpenAlexW3010612491MaRDI QIDQ2180737

Pablo Amorós

Publication date: 14 May 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109068

zbMATH Keywords

mechanism designsocial choice aggregation of experts' judgmentssub-majoritarian choice rule

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Implementation in dominant strategies of quota rules to choose one candidate ⋮ Using supermajority rules to aggregate judgments of possibly biased experts

Cites Work

• A Bayesian model of voting in juries
• Symmetry and impartial lotteries
• Aggregating experts' opinions to select the winner of a competition
• Impartial Nominations for a Prize

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