Learning, belief manipulation and optimal relationship termination

DOI10.1016/J.ECONLET.2020.109108zbMath1437.91266OpenAlexW3011873588MaRDI QIDQ2180753

Hong Gao, Haibo Xu

Publication date: 14 May 2020

Published in: Economics Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.econlet.2020.109108

zbMATH Keywords

hidden informationhidden actionbelief manipulationrelationship termination

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Applications of game theory (91A80) Dynamic games (91A25) Principal-agent models (91B43)

Cites Work

• The curse of long horizons
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Managerial Incentive Problems: A Dynamic Perspective
• Dynamic contracts when the agent's quality is unknown
• A principal-agent model of sequential testing
• Career concerns with exponential learning
• Dynamic contracting with limited commitment and the ratchet effect

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