Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies
From MaRDI portal
Publication:2183226
DOI10.1016/J.ORL.2020.04.011OpenAlexW3018924087MaRDI QIDQ2183226
Publication date: 26 May 2020
Published in: Operations Research Letters (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://crese.univ-fcomte.fr/uploads/wp/WP-2020-01.pdf
solidarity valueequal division value(weighted-) Shapley valueequal playersequal treatment of necessary playersnecessary players
Operations research, mathematical programming (90-XX) Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)
Related Items (2)
Cites Work
- Unnamed Item
- Characterizations of weighted and equal division values
- Population solidarity, population fair-ranking, and the egalitarian value
- Differential marginality, van den Brink fairness, and the Shapley value
- Axiomatizations of a class of equal surplus sharing solutions for TU-games
- Monotonic solutions of cooperative games
- On weighted Shapley values
- Conference structures and fair allocation rules
- Coincidence of and collinearity between game theoretic solutions
- Population monotonic allocation schemes for cooperative games with transferable utility
- The family of least square values for transferable utility games
- A solidarity value for \(n\)-person transferable utility games
- The nucleolus and kernel of veto-rich transferable utility games
- The balanced contributions property for equal contributors
- Membership separability: a new axiomatization of the Shapley value
- The balanced contributions property for symmetric players
- Relaxations of symmetry and the weighted Shapley values
- The within groups and the between groups Myerson values
- Sign symmetry vs symmetry: Young's characterization of the Shapley value revisited
- Axiomatizations of the conjunctive permission value for games with permission structures
- ``Procedural values for cooperative games
- Necessary players, myerson fairness and the equal treatment of equals
- Marginality and Myerson values
- Coalitional surplus desirability and the equal surplus division value
- Null or nullifying players: the difference between the Shapley value and equal division solutions
- Coalitional desirability and the equal division value
- How to share joint liability: a cooperative game approach
- The consensus value: a new solution concept for cooperative games
- Incentives, Decentralized Control, the Assignment of Joint Costs and Internal Pricing
- Graphs and Cooperation in Games
This page was built for publication: Necessary versus equal players in axiomatic studies