Evolution of cooperation in public goods games with stochastic opting-out
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Publication:2183968
DOI10.3390/g10010001zbMath1443.91157arXiv1709.03666OpenAlexW2963724363WikidataQ122312984 ScholiaQ122312984MaRDI QIDQ2183968
Alexander G. Ginsberg, Feng Fu
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1709.03666
Related Items (5)
Multiple learning mechanisms promote cooperation in public goods games with project selection ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of zero-determinant strategies in repeated multiplayer games ⋮ Interaction stochasticity may hinder cooperation in the spatial public goods game ⋮ Costly participation and the evolution of cooperation in the repeated public goods game ⋮ Evolutionary dynamics of cooperation in the \(N\)-person stag hunt game
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