Ideal reactive equilibrium
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Publication:2183998
DOI10.3390/G10020019zbMath1437.91025OpenAlexW2937261171MaRDI QIDQ2183998
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020019
Dynamic games (91A25) Equilibrium refinements (91A11) Games with incomplete information, Bayesian games (91A27)
Cites Work
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