Indirect evolution and aggregate-taking behavior in a football league: utility maximization, profit maximization, and success
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Publication:2184003
DOI10.3390/G10020022zbMath1443.91050OpenAlexW2946485269WikidataQ127891258 ScholiaQ127891258MaRDI QIDQ2184003
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020022
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