Indirect evolution and aggregate-taking behavior in a football league: utility maximization, profit maximization, and success

DOI10.3390/G10020022zbMath1443.91050OpenAlexW2946485269WikidataQ127891258 ScholiaQ127891258MaRDI QIDQ2184003

Aloys L. Prinz

Publication date: 27 May 2020

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020022

zbMATH Keywords

indirect evolutionevolutionary stabilityutility maximizationprofit maximizationfootball leagues

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Multistage and repeated games (91A20) Evolutionary games (91A22) Utility theory for games (91A30)

Cites Work

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• Equilibrium selection and the dynamic evolution of preferences
• Conjectural variations in aggregative games: an evolutionary perspective
• Evolution and market behavior
• Evolutionary foundations of aggregate-taking behavior
• Optimality and natural selection in markets
• Contest success functions
• What to maximize if you must
• The dynamic evolution of preferences
• The evolutionary stability of perfectly competitive behavior
• Evolutionary Games and Population Dynamics
• Profit Maximization and the Market Selection Hypothesis
• Evolution of Preferences1
• Nash equilibrium and the evolution of preferences

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