Optimal majority rule in referenda

DOI10.3390/G10020025zbMath1443.91131OpenAlexW2948174074WikidataQ127707505 ScholiaQ127707505MaRDI QIDQ2184007

Qingqing Cheng, Ming Li

Publication date: 27 May 2020

Published in: Games (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.3390/g10020025

zbMATH Keywords

majority rulereferendumsocial welfaresupermajoritymobilization

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Social choice (91B14) Welfare economics (91B15)

Cites Work

• Political Advertising and Election Results*
• Voting on Majority Rules

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