Group contributions in TU-games: a class of \(k\)-lateral Shapley values
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Publication:2184155
DOI10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.054zbMath1443.91022OpenAlexW3012313914MaRDI QIDQ2184155
Loyimee Gogoi, Rajnish Kumar, Surajit Borkotokey, Dhrubajit Choudhury
Publication date: 27 May 2020
Published in: European Journal of Operational Research (Search for Journal in Brave)
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1016/j.ejor.2020.03.054
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