A simple mechanism for a budget-constrained buyer
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Publication:2190384
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_7zbMath1443.91090arXiv1809.05207OpenAlexW3162639174MaRDI QIDQ2190384
Kamesh Munagala, Yu Cheng, Kang-Ning Wang, N. V. Gravin
Publication date: 18 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1809.05207
Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)
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Cites Work
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