Learning convex partitions and computing game-theoretic equilibria from best response queries

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_12zbMath1443.91020arXiv1807.06170OpenAlexW3160075640MaRDI QIDQ2190390

Paul W. Goldberg, Francisco J. Marmolejo-Cossío

Publication date: 18 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1807.06170

zbMATH Keywords

revealed preferencesequilibrium computationquery protocol

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Algorithmic game theory and complexity (91A68) Equilibrium refinements (91A11)

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