Prophet inequalities vs. approximating optimum online
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Publication:2190412
DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_24zbMath1437.91225OpenAlexW2901416849MaRDI QIDQ2190412
Ali Shameli, Amin Saberi, Rad Niazadeh
Publication date: 18 June 2020
Full work available at URL: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_24
Linear programming (90C05) Stopping times; optimal stopping problems; gambling theory (60G40) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Online algorithms; streaming algorithms (68W27)
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