Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents

DOI10.1007/978-3-030-04612-5_25zbMath1443.91096arXiv1810.02758OpenAlexW2894669842MaRDI QIDQ2190413

Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Ger Yang

Publication date: 18 June 2020

Full work available at URL: https://arxiv.org/abs/1810.02758

zbMATH Keywords

expected utility theorymechanism designrevenue optimal auction

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Utility theory (91B16) Auctions, bargaining, bidding and selling, and other market models (91B26) Mechanism design theory (91B03)

Related Items (2)

Risk-robust mechanism design for a prospect-theoretic buyer ⋮ Optimal mechanism design with risk-loving agents

Cites Work

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• Selling to risk averse buyers with unobservable tastes
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• Optimal Auctions with Risk Averse Buyers
• Optimal Auction Design
• Strong Duality for a Multiple-Good Monopolist
• A duality based unified approach to Bayesian mechanism design
• The Complexity of Optimal Mechanism Design

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