Quality and price personalization under customer recognition: a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria

DOI10.1016/J.JEDC.2020.103869OpenAlexW2929374636MaRDI QIDQ2191457

Joana Resende, Didier Laussel, Ngo Van Long

Publication date: 25 June 2020

Published in: Journal of Economic Dynamics \& Control (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hermes-ir.lib.hit-u.ac.jp/hermes/ir/re/30987/070_hiasDP-E-96.pdf

zbMATH Keywords

Markov perfect equilibriummonopolycoase conjecturecustomer informationinformational rent

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Game theory, economics, finance, and other social and behavioral sciences (91-XX)

Related Items (1)

Asymmetric information and differentiated durable goods monopoly: intra-period versus intertemporal discrimination

Cites Work

• Unnamed Item
• Intertemporal price--quality discrimination and the Coase conjecture
• The Coase conjecture need not hold for durable good monopolies with depreciation
• Monopoly and product quality
• Durable goods with quality differentiation
• Dynamic contracting under adverse selection and renegotiation
• Optimal Taxation with Endogenous Insurance Markets
• Oligopoly Extraction of a Common Property Natural Resource: The Importance of the Period of Commitment in Dynamic Games
• The Durable Goods Monopolist and Consistency with Increasing Costs
• The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts
• Incentive Compatibility and the Bargaining Problem
• Optimal Indirect and Capital Taxation
• Zero Expected Wealth Taxes: A Mirrlees Approach to Dynamic Optimal Taxation
• An Exploration in the Theory of Optimum Income Taxation

This page was built for publication: Quality and price personalization under customer recognition: a dynamic monopoly model with contrasting equilibria