Stability of the replicator equation for a single species with a multi-dimensional continuous trait space

DOI10.1016/j.jtbi.2005.07.022zbMath1445.92190OpenAlexW2154086774WikidataQ51961320 ScholiaQ51961320MaRDI QIDQ2195065

Ross Cressman, Josef Hofbauer, Frank Riedel

Publication date: 7 September 2020

Published in: Journal of Theoretical Biology (Search for Journal in Brave)

Full work available at URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10419/22918

zbMATH Keywords

weak topologyCSSadaptive dynamicsreplicator equationneighborhood superioritymeasure dynamicsNISstrategy dominance

Mathematics Subject Classification ID

Problems related to evolution (92D15) Applications of game theory (91A80) Evolutionary games (91A22)

Related Items (19)

CSS, NIS and dynamic stability for two-species behavioral models with continuous trait spaces ⋮ Imitative dynamics for games with continuous strategy space ⋮ Neighborhood strong superiority and evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ Asymptotic stability of strongly uninvadable sets ⋮ On superiority and weak stability of population states in evolutionary games ⋮ An effective replicator equation for games with a continuous strategy set ⋮ Stability of the replicator dynamics for games in metric spaces ⋮ Stochastic fictitious play with continuous action sets ⋮ Similarity Suppresses Cyclicity: Why Similar Competitors Form Hierarchies ⋮ Dynamically stable sets in infinite strategy spaces ⋮ Voronoi languages: equilibria in cheap-talk games with high-dimensional types and few signals ⋮ Dynamics of strategy distributions in a one-dimensional continuous trait space for games with a quadratic payoff function ⋮ Reflective Evolution Under Strategic Uncertainty ⋮ Red queen dynamics in specific predator-prey systems ⋮ Stability of faces in asymmetric evolutionary games ⋮ Revisiting matrix games: The concept of neighborhood invader strategies ⋮ Evolutionary stability of polymorphic profiles in asymmetric games ⋮ Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics: The continuous strategy case ⋮ The logit dynamic for games with continuous strategy sets

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